Analyzing a Plausible Scenario After the Temporary Ceasefire
Authors: Reza Kiani Movahed & Chat GPT
Following the temporary
ceasefire between Iran and Israel—achieved under American military and
diplomatic pressure—a pressing question has emerged: Could this halt in
hostilities mark the beginning of a deeper shift in the Islamic Republic’s
regional policies?
A question that is now occupying many minds:
Is it possible that Iran, without making any formal declaration, could move toward de facto recognition of Israel and begin to change its behavior?
This note outlines a realistic, step-by-step scenario in which Iran—facing both external pressure and internal crisis—gradually heads toward acknowledging Israel’s existence in practice, while maintaining its ideological stance in theory.
Phase One: Pressure and Promises
In the initial months, the
U.S. and its allies apply calculated, limited military strikes on Iran’s
nuclear and military infrastructure. At the same time, they send signals
indicating willingness to negotiate and ease sanctions.
Iran, teetering on the edge of economic collapse, begins contemplating a
strategy of “soft transition.”
Phase Two: A Shift in Tone, Not in Position
Iran’s rhetoric about
Israel shifts from “destruction” to “defending Palestinian rights.”
Symbolic slogans gradually disappear from schoolbooks and public speeches.
Simultaneously, Iran strengthens its ties with mediators such as Qatar and
Oman.
Phase Three: Informal Engagement
In a significant move, Iran
and Israel begin indirect interactions—for example, to avoid military clashes
in Syria or the Persian Gulf.
Iran also starts attending international forums in which Israel is
present—without staging walkouts or voicing objections.
Phase Four: De Facto Reality
Without establishing
diplomatic ties or formal recognition, Iran effectively acknowledges Israel as
a regional actor and participates in multilateral frameworks (security, energy,
maritime) that include Israel.
Domestically, policymakers tread carefully, preserving traditional slogans to
keep internal dissent at bay.
Potential Consequences
Conclusion
De facto recognition of
Israel would not mean peace, ideological surrender, or friendship. Rather, it
would be a survival tactic for Iran’s political system in the face of
overwhelming external pressure and internal crisis.
If this scenario unfolds, it should not be seen as the end of conflict—but as
the beginning of a new phase in the Middle East’s grand game.
Written By Chat GPT 4_______________________________________
Written by ChatGPT-4
Every war is founded on deception.
Israel’s recent strikes clearly align with Sun Tzu’s principles:
Limited, precise, and unpredictable attacks
Use of psychological and media deception
Targeting symbols of power, not just infrastructure
Deep strategic understanding of Iran’s weaknesses
As Sun Tzu says: “The battle is won in the mind and planning—not just on the battlefield.”
Alternative methods like cyberwarfare, industrial sabotage, or electronic warfare might have been more effective.
But Iran lacked international public support, internal unity, and persuasive power in global institutions—meaning it began the war as a perceived loser in the “global mind.”
“The best victory is defeating the enemy without fighting.”
But in this particular case, Iran chose to act directly rather than through proxies—thus only partially applying this principle.
Sun Tzu emphasizes that war must be quick, cost-effective, and results-driven, not exhausting and expensive.
| Sun Tzu Principle | Iran’s Action | Outcome |
|---|---|---|
| Military deception and surprise | Violated | Enemy fully prepared |
| Attack the enemy’s weakness | Violated | Attack hit strong points |
| Victory before war | Ignored | Lack of legitimacy/support |
| Flexibility and unpredictability | Ignored | Completely predictable response |
| Proxy warfare and diverse tools | Partially used, mostly sidelined | Incomplete use of strategic advantage |
| Economy in war | Ignored | High cost, low gain |
Unlike Israel—which carefully adhered to many of Sun Tzu’s principles—Iran’s military response resembled a traditional and emotional reaction, not one based on asymmetric warfare, deception, or adaptive strategy.
If Iran seeks to be more effective in the future, it must reform its military and media doctrine in line with the strategic teachings of The Art of War.
In recent days, a series of Iranian missile operations known as the “True Promise” has once again come under public and analytical scrutiny. While official media outlets and security institutions sought to suppress or limit any criticism to mere praise, the facts on the ground and strategic indicators suggest that both operations—True Promise I and II—have failed to achieve their broader objectives, despite their symbolic aspects.
This analysis focuses on three key elements behind the ineffectiveness of these operations: timing, target selection, and execution. Before diving into the details, it's important to emphasize that the main purpose of these strikes was to send a message of deterrence and showcase Iran’s “will respond.” However, the international reception of these attacks—and more importantly, Israel’s subsequent reactions—suggests that the message was either not delivered effectively or was misinterpreted.
To better understand the issue, one must revisit a turning point in Iran-U.S. tensions: Iran’s missile attack on the Ain al-Asad airbase in January 2020, launched in response to the assassination of General Qassem Soleimani. The most criticized aspect of that event was Iran’s one-week delay in retaliating—an interval that conveyed an image of indecision and weakness to the enemy. This same pattern repeated in the True Promise operations.
In True Promise I, Iran responded to Israel’s attack on its consulate in Damascus (April 1, 2025) with a 12-day delay, launching its attack on April 13. In True Promise II, the response to the assassination of Seyyed Hassan Nasrallah (September 28, 2025) came after only four days—a shorter delay, yet still insufficient to achieve the element of surprise.
In the third operation—True Promise III—the response was relatively faster. However, even a several-hour delay following a direct Israeli strike on Iranian territory indicated that strategic decision-making at the command level remained slow and uncertain.
Another major shortcoming in the previous operations was the preference for symbolic targets over strategic ones. While senior Iranian or allied figures were assassinated by Israel ahead of both operations, Iran’s retaliation was limited to second- or third-tier military bases. This approach sent a message not of deterrence, but rather of a lack of will for broader confrontation.
It was expected that in response to actions such as the assassination of Seyyed Hassan Nasrallah or the attack on the Iranian consulate, Iran would strike more critical sites—such as the presidential palace, the Knesset (parliament), or Israeli military headquarters. But by avoiding these key targets, Iran essentially left the strategic initiative in Israel’s hands.
On a technical level, the operations also lacked sufficient precision and intensity. The missiles used did not possess the warhead weight, targeting accuracy, or destructive power needed to significantly impair Israeli military infrastructure. For example, even the attack on the Nevatim airbase—potentially a strong strategic message—was not designed to incapacitate the base for even a few weeks.
This weakness—in warhead capability, accuracy, and missile volume—led to a situation in which Israel not only held its ground but proceeded to launch another attack on June 12. Put simply, the enemy concluded that even if Iran possesses the will, it lacks the capacity for an immediate and effective response.
Looking at the trajectory of the three True Promise operations, it becomes clear that the primary goal—demonstrating the military and political will of the Islamic Republic of Iran—has not been successfully achieved. Delayed responses, conservative target choices, and poor technical execution have made these strikes resemble media performances more than strategic disruptions.
If future Iranian military responses are to be taken more seriously, a revision in three core areas is essential: rapid decision-making, effective target selection, and decisive execution. Otherwise, subsequent operations will likely be little more than replays of previous half-measures—lacking deterrent power and risking further escalation of threats.