There’s an old saying: Defeat is an orphan, but victory has a thousand fathers. That may be the most accurate reflection of what we’ve witnessed in the wake of Iran’s recent missile operation, known as True Promise III. While last year’s sudden assault by Hamas on Israel drew a flood of breathless commentary, forecasts, and “countdown timers to Israel’s collapse,” today there is mostly silence—and a conspicuous lack of serious analysis.
Back on 7th October (2003) attack to Israel by Hamas, many Iranian pundits were racing to out-analyze one another, predicting Israel’s rapid demise following the attack. Now, after a major Iranian missile strike in response to an Israeli attack on 13th June, we hear little but retroactive warnings: “We told you this would happen.”
But the real question is being ignored: How, with such an expansive security and intelligence apparatus, did such a strategic failure even occur? How did we reach a point where our soil was directly struck, and the response, though dramatic in scale, yielded underwhelming results? The roots of this failure go deeper than the decisions made last year. In fact, we must rewind the clock all the way to 1991, during Saddam Hussein’s invasion of Kuwait.
How Saddam Set the Trap—and We Walked into It
In 1991, as Saddam Hussein invaded and annexed Kuwait, he found himself facing a powerful international coalition. Hoping to fracture the unity between Arab states and the West, Saddam turned to a desperate gambit: launching ballistic missiles at Israel. He believed that an Israeli counterattack would force Arab governments—sensitive to public opinion—to break ranks with the U.S.-led coalition.
Israel, unsurprisingly, responded not with counterfire, but with dramatic appeals for international sympathy. It played the victim card well—and effectively rallied Western support.
Meanwhile, Iran, having just emerged from an eight-year war with Iraq, was carefully observing this theater of war. During the Iran–Iraq War, Saddam had used ballistic missiles extensively against Iranian cities, not for military gain, but to terrorize civilians. Lacking access to modern fighter jets and spare parts due to sanctions, Iran began to view ballistic missiles as a viable, cost-effective alternative. By the late 1980s, Iran had already launched its domestic missile program, reverse-engineering and eventually upgrading Russian-made missiles.
But here lies the crucial mistake: Iraq’s missiles in 1991 did not inflict meaningful damage on Israel. The Israeli victim narrative was largely theater—designed not only to rally support but to draw Iran into the same trap.
The Manufactured Threat: A Trap Built on Fear
Over the years, Iran’s strategic focus narrowed more and more toward missile development—especially ballistic missiles. While Iran made real advances in multiple missile categories (anti-tank, cruise, surface-to-air, naval), it was always the ballistic missiles that drew the loudest international reaction. This wasn't by accident.
Each time Iran launched a satellite or tested a long-range missile, the West, led by Israel, amplified the threat. But when Iran developed cruise missiles or naval strike capabilities, there was barely a whisper. This carefully calibrated reaction served one purpose: to convince Iranian policymakers that ballistic missiles were the West’s greatest fear—and, therefore, Iran’s best asset.
Israel and the U.S. fed this illusion while simultaneously advancing their own anti-ballistic missile systems. Over time, they boxed Iran—and its regional proxies—into a strategic corner. Iran poured resources into a military platform whose effectiveness was steadily declining in the face of new defensive technologies.
True Promise: A Wake-Up Call Wrapped in Failure
During the True Promise III operation, Iran reportedly launched between 100 and 150 ballistic missiles at Israeli targets in the first wave of attack. The exact figures are murky, but according to multiple sources, as few as six missiles may have struck their intended targets. Even if we assume a generous number like 60, that’s still only a one-third success rate—hardly a strategic victory.
More troubling than the failure of the missiles is the failure of the strategy itself. If, after decades of investment and development, the result is a handful of civilian casualties and limited damage, then we must confront the uncomfortable truth: ballistic missiles no longer provide the deterrent or shock effect they once did.
For years, suggestions to invest in tanks, warships, or airpower were dismissed with lines like “those days are over.” Instead, the entire weight of military development leaned heavily on missiles—based on a psychological game played by adversaries who were always two steps ahead.
Conclusion: A Time for Rethinking, Not Retrenchment
We now face a stark moment of clarity. The True Promise operation should not be celebrated as a moment of triumph—it should be analyzed as a strategic mirror, reflecting decades of flawed assumptions and misplaced priorities.
If a strategy born in 1991 cannot protect us in 2025, it may be time to rethink that strategy—not out of fear, but out of realism. Not to retreat, but to survive.
Reza Kiani
2025/06/16