The Iran–Israel Missile Conflict Through the Lens of The Art of War by Sun Tzu

Written by ChatGPT-4

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Analysis of Israel's Missile Strikes in Light of Sun Tzu’s The Art of War

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1. Principle: “All warfare is based on deception.”

Every war is founded on deception.

Analysis:

Israel used tactical deception (such as feigned movements near unrelated borders or contradictory media messaging) to confuse Iranian military analysts and delay Iran’s response.

A limited and unpredictable strike, especially following claims that the confrontation was over, precisely fits this principle.

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2. Principle: “If the enemy is united, divide him.”

Analysis:

By increasing psychological pressure and undermining Iran’s military credibility, the objective could be to sow division among military commanders, political elites, or allied forces within the "Axis of Resistance." These attacks are designed to weaken Iran from within rather than destroy it from the outside.

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3. Principle: “Attack what the enemy protects.”

Analysis:

Israel targeted sensitive and symbolic sites (such as military bases or radar systems), which had high psychological and media impact—even if physical damage was limited.

Attacking from a location or angle Iran did not expect is one of Sun Tzu’s golden rules.

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4. Principle: “Wage quick, precise war with minimal direct engagement.”

Analysis:

Israel seeks to achieve strategic objectives through short, precise, and high-cost strikes for the opponent—without entering full-scale war.

Sun Tzu repeatedly emphasizes that war should be swift and effective, not drawn-out and attritional.

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5. Principle: “Know the enemy and know yourself.”

Analysis:

Israel clearly demonstrated deep knowledge of Iran’s vulnerabilities and response limitations—economic hardship, domestic unrest, limited capacity for large-scale retaliation, and international pressure.

This accurate knowledge has been the key to executing limited but impactful operations.

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6. Principle: “Victory is won before battle begins.”

Analysis:

Before launching attacks, Israel psychologically and diplomatically weakened Iran and gained global support—setting the stage for a pre-won war.

Sun Tzu emphasizes that a good commander wins the battle in the fields of mind, politics, and perception before it begins on the ground.

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Conclusion:

Israel’s recent strikes clearly align with Sun Tzu’s principles:

• Limited, precise, and unpredictable attacks

• Use of psychological and media deception

• Targeting symbols of power, not just infrastructure

• Deep strategic understanding of Iran’s weaknesses

As Sun Tzu says: “The battle is won in the mind and planning—not just on the battlefield.”

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Analysis of Iran’s Military Response in Light of Sun Tzu’s The Art of War

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1. Violation of the Principle of Deception and Surprise

Analysis:

Iran’s response was direct, public, and pre-announced (e.g., “True Promise Operation”).

Sun Tzu advocates for surprise, but Iran publicly declared the time and path of its attack—effectively giving Israel the opportunity for full defense.

This is a direct contradiction of the principle of deception.

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2. Violation of the Principle: Attack the Enemy’s Weakness

Analysis:

Iran mostly targeted military bases and areas Israel had long prepared to defend (e.g., Dimona or command centers).

That means it struck exactly where the enemy was ready, not where it was vulnerable.

Alternative methods like cyberwarfare, industrial sabotage, or electronic warfare might have been more effective.

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3. Violation of the Principle: Win Before the War Begins

Analysis:

Sun Tzu emphasizes achieving victory through diplomacy, intelligence, public opinion, and internal readiness before the actual battle.

But Iran lacked international public support, internal unity, and persuasive power in global institutions—meaning it began the war as a perceived loser in the “global mind.”

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4. Violation of the Principle: Flexibility and Unpredictability

Analysis:

Iran’s response was based on classic, traceable ballistic missiles.

Sun Tzu advises that attacks should be like water—flowing where there’s no resistance. Iran’s path and tools were predetermined and highly predictable.

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5. Partial Application of the Principle of Proxy Warfare and Diversified Tools

Analysis:

Over the years, Iran has built a sophisticated network of proxies (Hamas, Hezbollah, Houthis, PMF, Fatemiyoun, etc.),

which aligns with Sun Tzu’s idea that:

“The best victory is defeating the enemy without fighting.”

But in this particular case, Iran chose to act directly rather than through proxies—thus only partially applying this principle.

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6. Violation of the Principle of Economy in War

Analysis:

In a fragile economic state, Iran launched a direct and costly confrontation.

The strike had limited military impact but high media and economic costs.

Sun Tzu emphasizes that war must be quick, cost-effective, and results-driven, not exhausting and expensive.

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Final Summary

Sun Tzu Principle	Iran’s Action	Outcome
Military deception and surprise	Violated	Enemy fully prepared
Attack the enemy’s weakness	Violated	Attack hit strong points
Victory before war	Ignored	Lack of legitimacy/support
Flexibility and unpredictability	Ignored	Completely predictable response
Proxy warfare and diverse tools	Partially used, mostly sidelined	Incomplete use of strategic advantage
Economy in war	Ignored	High cost, low gain

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Final Conclusion:

Unlike Israel—which carefully adhered to many of Sun Tzu’s principles—Iran’s military response resembled a traditional and emotional reaction, not one based on asymmetric warfare, deception, or adaptive strategy.

If Iran seeks to be more effective in the future, it must reform its military and media doctrine in line with the strategic teachings of The Art of War.

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Analyzing the Failure of “True Promise”: Delay, Vague Targeting, and Weak Execution

In recent days, a series of Iranian missile operations known as the “True Promise” has once again come under public and analytical scrutiny. While official media outlets and security institutions sought to suppress or limit any criticism to mere praise, the facts on the ground and strategic indicators suggest that both operations—True Promise I and II—have failed to achieve their broader objectives, despite their symbolic aspects.

This analysis focuses on three key elements behind the ineffectiveness of these operations: timing, target selection, and execution. Before diving into the details, it's important to emphasize that the main purpose of these strikes was to send a message of deterrence and showcase Iran’s “will respond.” However, the international reception of these attacks—and more importantly, Israel’s subsequent reactions—suggests that the message was either not delivered effectively or was misinterpreted.

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Lessons from Ain al-Asad: An Alarm That Went Unheeded

To better understand the issue, one must revisit a turning point in Iran-U.S. tensions: Iran’s missile attack on the Ain al-Asad airbase in January 2020, launched in response to the assassination of General Qassem Soleimani. The most criticized aspect of that event was Iran’s one-week delay in retaliating—an interval that conveyed an image of indecision and weakness to the enemy. This same pattern repeated in the True Promise operations.

In True Promise I, Iran responded to Israel’s attack on its consulate in Damascus (April 1, 2025) with a 12-day delay, launching its attack on April 13. In True Promise II, the response to the assassination of Seyyed Hassan Nasrallah (September 28, 2025) came after only four days—a shorter delay, yet still insufficient to achieve the element of surprise.

In the third operation—True Promise III—the response was relatively faster. However, even a several-hour delay following a direct Israeli strike on Iranian territory indicated that strategic decision-making at the command level remained slow and uncertain.

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Target Selection: From Deterrence to Symbolism

Another major shortcoming in the previous operations was the preference for symbolic targets over strategic ones. While senior Iranian or allied figures were assassinated by Israel ahead of both operations, Iran’s retaliation was limited to second- or third-tier military bases. This approach sent a message not of deterrence, but rather of a lack of will for broader confrontation.

It was expected that in response to actions such as the assassination of Seyyed Hassan Nasrallah or the attack on the Iranian consulate, Iran would strike more critical sites—such as the presidential palace, the Knesset (parliament), or Israeli military headquarters. But by avoiding these key targets, Iran essentially left the strategic initiative in Israel’s hands.

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Technical Execution: A Strike That Fell Short

On a technical level, the operations also lacked sufficient precision and intensity. The missiles used did not possess the warhead weight, targeting accuracy, or destructive power needed to significantly impair Israeli military infrastructure. For example, even the attack on the Nevatim airbase—potentially a strong strategic message—was not designed to incapacitate the base for even a few weeks.

This weakness—in warhead capability, accuracy, and missile volume—led to a situation in which Israel not only held its ground but proceeded to launch another attack on June 12. Put simply, the enemy concluded that even if Iran possesses the will, it lacks the capacity for an immediate and effective response.

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Conclusion: Deterrence or Deconstruction?

Looking at the trajectory of the three True Promise operations, it becomes clear that the primary goal—demonstrating the military and political will of the Islamic Republic of Iran—has not been successfully achieved. Delayed responses, conservative target choices, and poor technical execution have made these strikes resemble media performances more than strategic disruptions.

If future Iranian military responses are to be taken more seriously, a revision in three core areas is essential: rapid decision-making, effective target selection, and decisive execution. Otherwise, subsequent operations will likely be little more than replays of previous half-measures—lacking deterrent power and risking further escalation of threats.

The Iran Ballistic Mirage: From the Gulf War to “True Promise”

June 16, 2025

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There’s an old saying: Defeat is an orphan, but victory has a thousand fathers. That may be the most accurate reflection of what we’ve witnessed in the wake of Iran’s recent missile operation, known as True Promise III. While last year’s sudden assault by Hamas on Israel drew a flood of breathless commentary, forecasts, and “countdown timers to Israel’s collapse,” today there is mostly silence—and a conspicuous lack of serious analysis.

Back on 7th October (2003) attack to Israel by Hamas, many Iranian pundits were racing to out-analyze one another, predicting Israel’s rapid demise following the attack. Now, after a major Iranian missile strike in response to an Israeli attack on 13th June, we hear little but retroactive warnings: “We told you this would happen.”

But the real question is being ignored: How, with such an expansive security and intelligence apparatus, did such a strategic failure even occur? How did we reach a point where our soil was directly struck, and the response, though dramatic in scale, yielded underwhelming results? The roots of this failure go deeper than the decisions made last year. In fact, we must rewind the clock all the way to 1991, during Saddam Hussein’s invasion of Kuwait.

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How Saddam Set the Trap—and We Walked into It

In 1991, as Saddam Hussein invaded and annexed Kuwait, he found himself facing a powerful international coalition. Hoping to fracture the unity between Arab states and the West, Saddam turned to a desperate gambit: launching ballistic missiles at Israel. He believed that an Israeli counterattack would force Arab governments—sensitive to public opinion—to break ranks with the U.S.-led coalition.

Israel, unsurprisingly, responded not with counterfire, but with dramatic appeals for international sympathy. It played the victim card well—and effectively rallied Western support.

Meanwhile, Iran, having just emerged from an eight-year war with Iraq, was carefully observing this theater of war. During the Iran–Iraq War, Saddam had used ballistic missiles extensively against Iranian cities, not for military gain, but to terrorize civilians. Lacking access to modern fighter jets and spare parts due to sanctions, Iran began to view ballistic missiles as a viable, cost-effective alternative. By the late 1980s, Iran had already launched its domestic missile program, reverse-engineering and eventually upgrading Russian-made missiles.

But here lies the crucial mistake: Iraq’s missiles in 1991 did not inflict meaningful damage on Israel. The Israeli victim narrative was largely theater—designed not only to rally support but to draw Iran into the same trap.

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The Manufactured Threat: A Trap Built on Fear

Over the years, Iran’s strategic focus narrowed more and more toward missile development—especially ballistic missiles. While Iran made real advances in multiple missile categories (anti-tank, cruise, surface-to-air, naval), it was always the ballistic missiles that drew the loudest international reaction. This wasn't by accident.

Each time Iran launched a satellite or tested a long-range missile, the West, led by Israel, amplified the threat. But when Iran developed cruise missiles or naval strike capabilities, there was barely a whisper. This carefully calibrated reaction served one purpose: to convince Iranian policymakers that ballistic missiles were the West’s greatest fear—and, therefore, Iran’s best asset.

Israel and the U.S. fed this illusion while simultaneously advancing their own anti-ballistic missile systems. Over time, they boxed Iran—and its regional proxies—into a strategic corner. Iran poured resources into a military platform whose effectiveness was steadily declining in the face of new defensive technologies.

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True Promise: A Wake-Up Call Wrapped in Failure

During the True Promise III operation, Iran reportedly launched between 100 and 150 ballistic missiles at Israeli targets in the first wave of attack. The exact figures are murky, but according to multiple sources, as few as six missiles may have struck their intended targets. Even if we assume a generous number like 60, that’s still only a one-third success rate—hardly a strategic victory.

More troubling than the failure of the missiles is the failure of the strategy itself. If, after decades of investment and development, the result is a handful of civilian casualties and limited damage, then we must confront the uncomfortable truth: ballistic missiles no longer provide the deterrent or shock effect they once did.

For years, suggestions to invest in tanks, warships, or airpower were dismissed with lines like “those days are over.” Instead, the entire weight of military development leaned heavily on missiles—based on a psychological game played by adversaries who were always two steps ahead.

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Conclusion: A Time for Rethinking, Not Retrenchment

We now face a stark moment of clarity. The True Promise operation should not be celebrated as a moment of triumph—it should be analyzed as a strategic mirror, reflecting decades of flawed assumptions and misplaced priorities.

If a strategy born in 1991 cannot protect us in 2025, it may be time to rethink that strategy—not out of fear, but out of realism. Not to retreat, but to survive.

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Reza Kiani

2025/06/16